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The Honorable Richard B. Russell United States Senate Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Russell:

You will no doubt have noted this morning's WASHINGTON POST editorial entitled "The CIA Again." I presume that this matter will be discussed, perhaps on the floor of the U. S. Congress.

The editorial is entirely erroneous. I refer you to a statement by the President in an interview with the Messrs. Huntley and Brinkley on 9 September in which he said:

"Q: Does the GIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

A: No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. (John) McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. Mc-Cone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department."

Sincerely,

(Signoi) 1.1.1 A. McCONA

John A. McCone

Attachment:

Identical letters sent to Congressman Carl Vinson and Congressman Clarence Cannon

WE:mcm 1 - LC w/att; 1 - C/FE w/att Origs w/att ea Adressee; 1 - DCI Chrono w/att; 1 - DCI #3-6 w/att; 1 - ER w/att
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## The Washi

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

## The CIA Again

The United States has been understandably embarrassed by the disclosure that the CIA has been secretly aiding the South Viet-Nam Special Forces that conducted the raids on Buddhist pagodas. Yet this is, unfortunately, not the first time the Government has been made to look foolish by the misnamed Central Intelligence Agency. And the trouble is precisely that the CIA does not confine itself to gathering intelligence but has been given operational responsibility for tasks for which it has debatable competence.

One might have supposed that the Bay of Pigs debacle would have alerted the White House to the risks of allowing an intelligence agency to sit in judgment on its own operational missions. The temptation is strong to tailor intelligence to support preconceived opinion. Moreover, when the CIA invests its prestige in supporting a given course, there is an all-too-human tendency to seek vindication for a commitment of money and judgment.

This seems to lie behind the present muddle over CIA misadventures in Saigon. The agency's mission chief in that country had established close and cordial relations with Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother and sponsor of the Special Forces. Some \$3 million a year was earmarked for helping the Special Forces. But reportedly the CIA had no advance warning that the Forces would invade the pagodas and the initial intelligence reaction was confused—contributing to the confusion in Washington over what transpired that fateful day.

Nevertheless, the payments evidently continued in the face of Government policy to the contrary, and the Administration has been reduced to a stutter in trying to explain what has happened. Ironically, notwithstanding the CIA subsidy, the pro-Diem press in Saigon has been bitterly attacking the American agency for allegedly taking part in an attempted coup against the regime.

Let it be said that the CIA contains men of undoubted skill and patriotism. Let it also be said that much of the American problem in Saigon springs out of circumstances that not even the wisest of men could easily meet. But some self-inflicted wounds form part of the heartbreaking calamity. In the past, there has been a distressing tendency to subordinate political to military considerations and to avert the eyes from unpleasant realities. The CIA, while not alone in this feiling, was unable to provide a detached intelligence corrective because its own agents were enmeshed in the operations of the regime.

There are many rueful lessons in the South Vietnamese tragedy, and not the least of them is that it makes sense in every respect to divorce intelligence from operations that belong in the military sphere. It would be heartening if the present embarrassment were turned to useful purpose by effecting a real reorganization of the CIA. The opportunity should have been grasped after the Cuban invasion; if nothing is done now, Reca see 2007/11/2 and the agency may 66 Reca 28

lessly humiliated again.